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Abstract 
 
 
Using panel data from nine European countries over the period 1970 to 2007, we examine the impact of 
information and communication technology (ICT) on the demand for older workers (aged 50 and over). We find 
evidence of a decrease in demand for older workers in the 1970s and 1980s. It can be argued that the impact of 
ICT on demand for older workers is skill-biased. However, the skill-biased demand for older workers is mainly 
reflected in the skill-biased changes in employment shares rather than relative wages. There is some evidence of a 
gradual deskilling of older workers. We find that labour market institutions such as the national minimum wage, 
social pacts on wage issues and union density mostly benefit skilled older workers, while coordination of wage 
setting, extension of collective agreements, social pacts on pensions and centralisation of wage bargaining can 
alleviate the adverse effects of  skill-biased technological change.  
 
JEL Classifications: J21, J24, J31  
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1. Introduction  
 
A number of existing studies have attempted to identify the determinants of the skilled-
unskilled wage premium. Some studies have focused on the role of technology or skill-biased 
technological change (SBTC), especially the impact of information communication technology 
(ICT) (e.g., see Acemoglu, 1998 and Mallick and Sousa, 2017).
1
 Using firm and industry level 
data, it has been argued that improvements in ICT have allowed highly skilled workers to earn 
higher wages (e.g., see Autor et al., 1998).
2
 Skill, or educational attainment, is only one 
dimension of worker characteristics that influence their ability to adapt to new technology. 
Other dimensions include gender and age. However, few studies have focused on these aspects. 
Exceptions include Card and Lemieux (2001) who argue that the well-known increase in the 
skill premium for college-educated workers in the US in the 1980s was concentrated in 
younger age cohorts and could be attributed to a low supply of graduates relative to previous 
cohorts. In a more recent study, Daveri and Maliranta (2007) consider the links amongst age, 
seniority, wages and information technology.
3
 
The focus of this paper is on the age dimension, in particular, the demand for workers 
aged 50 and over in Europe. We discuss the complementarities between human capital and 
technology, where technology is represented by capital accumulation in the form of ICT. 
Human capital theory (Becker, 1964; Mincer, 1974) suggests that the decision to invest in 
human capital is based on cost-benefit considerations for both employers and employees. In 
relation to new technology, human capital theory predicts that lower levels of learning ability 
contribute to lower productivity in the workplace. It is generally believed that learning ability 
declines after a certain age and it can therefore be argued that the effectiveness of human 
capital investment (in terms of the potential gains to the employer from higher productivity and 
the worker from higher earnings) declines with age. This is likely to lead to both lower offers 
of human capital investment in older workers and less incentive for them to accept any offers 
                                                     
1
 The literature on the determinants of skilled-unskilled wage inequality is rapidly growing. Some recent empirical 
studies have started to focus on the role of non-market factors. For example, using data on 43 US industries from 
1968 to 2012, Kristal and Cohen (2016) argue that a decline in unionization and the real value of the 
minimum wage can also account for a significant proportion of skilled-unskilled wage inequality in the US. Other 
related studies, such as Kawaguchi and Mori (2014), aim to explain rising wage inequality by focusing on supply 
side factors. Using micro data from some European countries, Garnero et al. (2014) examine the impact of the 
minimum wage and collective bargaining on wage inequality.  
 
2
 In a very interesting recent study, using decomposition techniques, Marouani and Nilsson (2016) provide 
evidence of skill-biased technological change in Malaysia in recent years. 
 
3
 Messinis and Ahmed (2013) use a new measure of human capital that also takes education, cognitive skill, life 
expectancy and the use of ICT into account.  
2 
 
that come their way (O‟Mahony and Peng, 2009; Carmichael and Ercolani, 2014).4 Caselli 
(1999) shows that a biased technology revolution affects wage inequality if the workforce is 
heterogeneous in training cost. Lower levels of learning ability may also raise the cost of 
human capital investment in older workers, in terms of time and effort, which could have an 
additional negative impact on the motivation to invest in such human capital. Hence, human 
capital investment (training) theory suggests a negative relationship between the demand for 
labour for older workers and new technology. 
While this paper focuses on the impact of ICT on demand for older workers in some 
European countries, related studies have also considered the more general issue of the 
interactions between technology (especially ICT), efficiency, employment and skills. For 
example, using panel data for the UK manufacturing sector over the 1976-1982 period, Van 
Reenen (1997) finds that technological innovation has a positive impact on employment. A 
similar positive link between innovation (usually measured by R&D spending) and 
employment is found by Piva and Vivarelli (2005) and Hall et al. (2008) in Italy, Lachenmaier 
and Rottmann (2011) in Germany, Mitra and Jha (2015) in India, and Ciriaci et al. (2016) in 
Spain. Disaggregated studies that deal with the impact of technology on employment produced 
mixed results. For example, while focusing on the UK, Greenhalgh et al. (2001) find that the 
positive impact of R&D on employment was limited to high-tech industries. However, 
Lachenmaier and Rottmann (2011) did not find any significant sectoral heterogeneity between 
high-tech and non-high-tech sectors. Using time series data on 677 European companies over 
the 1990-2008 period, Bogliacino et al. (2012) find that the job creation effect of R&D 
spending was present only in the services and high-tech manufacturing sectors.  
Technology affects employment though process and product innovation. It is generally 
believed that process innovation has a negative effect on employment whereas product 
innovation is basically labour-friendly (Brouwer et al., 1993; Smolny, 1998). Using data from 
France, Germany, Spain and the UK over the 1998-2000 period, Harrison et al. (2014) found 
evidence of process innovation as well as product innovation effect on employment. However, 
Hall et al. (2008) and Lachenmaier and Rottmann (2011) failed to find the employment 
displacement effect of process innovation. Even though most new technologies are labour 
saving, improvement in technology has not resulted in large scale unemployment. 
                                                     
4
 It can also be argued that older workers will have fewer years left in the workforce and that makes learning new 
skills less attractive both to them and to employers. At the same time, older workers, due to their accumulated 
experience, can remain highly productive. However, without learning new skills, at some stage, experience would 
not be able to offset the lack of knowledge of new technology. Other related studies include Pianta (2005), Frey 
and Osborne, and Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2014).  
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The initial labour-saving effect of process innovation can be counterbalanced by market 
compensation forces via new machines, new investments, decrease in prices and wages, and 
increase in income (Vivarelli, 2014). The possible labour-friendly impact of product innovation 
can also mitigate the negative effect of new technology on employment (Vivarelli and Pianta, 
2000). The empirical evidence presented by Evangelista and Vezzani (2012) suggests that both 
technological and organizational innovation exert a positive impact on employment mainly by 
improving growth performances of the firms. They also find evidence of diminishing relevance 
of the labour displacing effect of the process innovation. Thus, the existing literature tends to 
support a positive link between new technology and employment, especially when R&D and/or 
production innovation are used as proxies for technological change and when high-tech sector 
become the focus of the study.  
In some sectors, such as microelectronics and telecommunications where technology is 
skilled labour-friendly, improvement in ICT can be considered as product innovation. However, 
in the case of the manufacturing and services sector, improvement in ICT can be viewed as 
labour saving process innovation. The relationship between the ICT and employment is 
considerably more complex. The combined effect of process and product innovation can vary 
considerably across countries and sectors.  
While the early studies focused on the quantitative aspect of the link between technology 
on employment, recent studies also consider the qualitative aspects in term of SBTC (Vivarelli, 
2014). Several studies have reported that ICT and R&D investments contribute positively to 
the productivity and efficiency of firms (Acemoglu, 2015; Bonanno, 2016). The SBTC has 
shifted the demand for labour in favour of skilled workers thereby increasing the employment 
opportunities and wages of skilled workers (Acemoglu and Autor, 2011). At the same time, the 
past few decades have witnessed a rapid (and simultaneous) growth in both the highest- and 
lowest-skilled job. This phenomenon, which is also referred to as job polarization, is evident in 
the US (e.g., see Autor and Dorn, 2013; and Autor, 2015), the UK (e.g., see Goos and Manning, 
2007), Germany (e.g., Spitz-Oener 2006; Dustmann et al., 2009) and Sweden (e.g., Adermon 
and Gustavsson, 2015). Goos et al. (2014) and Michael et al. (2014) find that the high- and 
low-paying occupations have expanded relative to middle-wage occupations in most European 
countries, suggesting that job polarization is pervasive across advanced economies.  
The main explanation for the observed job polarization is that the new technologies are 
mainly designed towards replacing labour in routine tasks (Routine-biased technological 
change, RBTC) thereby decreasing the demand for middle-skilled “routine” cognitive and 
manual jobs. Workers with non-routine tasks lie at the two opposite ends of the skill 
4 
 
distribution. For example, the professional speciality and manual personal services (Autor and 
Dorn, 2013).  
In this paper, we attempt to test whether new technologies (especially the ICT) are 
complementary or substitute to the use of older workers within an industry. The SBTC 
hypothesis implies that employment (and therefore the earnings) of older workers decline as 
new technologies become available. However, the RBTC hypothesis highlights the advantages 
of older workers over the current technology. Older workers tend to have well developed job-
specific abilities that help them apply the ICT to deal with non-routine tasks requiring 
situational adaptability and in-person interactions (Autor and Dorn, 2009). Accordingly, the 
older workers may gain employment in low-skill non-routine occupations within an industry. 
It is commonly believed that learning ability deteriorates with age. However, the 
evidence is mixed (e.g., see Waldman and Avolio, 1986 and Wooden et al., 2001).  If the new 
technology developed is codified in a standard way, then the lower learning ability of older 
workers might not be viewed as a serious obstacle to investment in human capital. The existing 
literature also suggests that different stages in the diffusion of technology can affect the 
demand for skilled workers. In some respects, ICT capital appears to become less 
complementary with skilled (or younger) workers over time. Chun (2003) argues for the need 
to distinguish between the short-run adoption effect that ICT has on the demand for skills and 
the long-run use effect, which may be considered as the “real” change in skill bias. Chun‟s 
analysis implies that, as new technology is fully implemented, firms can replace high-wage, 
highly educated workers with lower-paid older workers who are not highly educated. Ruiz-
Arranz (2004) provides evidence of a decreasing contribution of ICT capital-skill 
complementarity to the growth of the skill premium in the US since the 1980s. More recent 
studies on job polarization, for example Michaels et al. (2014) and Goos et al. (2014), argue 
that ICT has led to an increase in demand for highly educated workers at the expense of 
middle-educated workers but demand for low-educated workers has scarcely been affected. 
Thus, a deskilling effect may replace the skill-biased demand for older workers at the late stage 
of the adoption process of new technology. 
This paper investigates the impact of ICT on the demand for various types of workers 
(including a split by gender, three education groups and age) by using EU-KLEMS data.
5
 We 
contribute to the existing literature in a number of ways. First, we estimate wage bill share 
equations for nine European Union (EU) countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
                                                     
5
 See Timmer et al. (2007a and b), http://www.euklems.net/  
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Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the UK, using a uniquely diverse and disaggregated 
dataset involving 11 industry groups over the period 1970-2007. The dataset includes the 
service sectors as well as manufacturing. These sectors have been significantly affected by ICT 
(O‟Mahony and van Ark, 2003). Thus, we are able to investigate the effect of skill-biased 
technology broken down by gender, age and education. 
Second, a key feature of this paper is the consideration of the extent to which the impact 
of ICT on the demand for older workers is a long-term or merely a transient effect.
6
 The use of 
industry data with a longer time span allows one to develop a deeper understanding of the 
evolution of technology over time and its impact on wage inequality. If, in the long run, 
technology is deskilling, we expect to see a gradual shift in the demand for older workers as 
ICT knowledge becomes more codified and accessible. The difference in the timing of the 
diffusion and adoption effects between countries is also considered by testing for structural 
differences in the estimated coefficients over time.  
Third, we also considered the impact of labour market institutions on the wage shares of 
older workers.  Vivarelli and Pianta (2000) and Vivarelli (2014) argue that the historical and 
institutional circumstances (e.g., social safety nets, reduction in working hours, union strategies 
and labour market flexibility) can have a significant impact on the dynamic relationship 
between new technologies and employment. Institutional setting can also mitigate the 
hindrances to compensation mechanism and alleviate the negative effect of new technologies 
on employment, especially for older workers. Countries may adopt and utilise technologies 
differently, depending on their institutional regulatory structure and absorptive capacity in 
relation to the availability of new technology (Acemoglu, 1998; Lewis 2011). The rigidity of 
labour market institutions and employment protection have been offered as explanations for the 
persistently higher unemployment rate and lower skill premium in Continental Europe (Peng 
and Siebert 2008; Anger, 2011; Afonso, 2016).  On the other hand, institutions responsible for 
relative wage rigidity in continental Europe also encourage investment in technology that 
increases the productivity of less skilled or older workers, thus implying relatively less skill-
biased technological change in these countries compared to the US (Acemoglu, 2003).
7
 Thus, 
we need estimate the impact of these labour market institutions with a long history on the wage 
shares of older workers. 
                                                     
6
 The age groups used in this paper are defined as follows: 15-29 is young workers, 30-49 is senior workers and 
50+ is older workers.  
 
7
 A number of studies have examined related issues using firm level data. For example, see Aubert et al. (2006) 
and Schone (2009). 
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Finally, we decompose the skill-biased effect of technology on labour compensation into 
changes in the employment shares and relative wages. We find that relative wages are 
deskilling over a long period while skill-biased demand is mainly reflected in the skill-biased 
changes in employment shares, which is consistent with the findings of Mallick and Sousa 
(2017). We also test the speed of adjustment of wage shares to technological changes using a 
dynamic panel model incorporating an error correction mechanism and reject the assumption of 
inertia in wage shares adjustment.    
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the empirical model 
involving education, gender and age bias. Section 3 describes the data. The empirical results 
are presented and discussed in Section 4 and Section 5 contains some concluding remarks.    
2. Empirical specification  
 
The empirical specification used in this paper to analyse the impact of technology on 
the wage shares of skilled and unskilled workers is based on, among others, Chun (2003) and 
O‟Mahony et al. (2008). Wage shares are assumed to depend on the capital-output ratio and the 
share of ICT capital in total capital. As a first step, total labour cost in industry i at time t is 
expressed as a function of the average wage of the different groups of workers, the stock of 
capital and real output as follows: 
 
                                      ( ,...., , , )it jit nit it itLC f pa pa K Y                                            (1) 
 
LCit is the labour cost in industry i at time t;  pajit is the wage rate for the j-th age group and n is 
the total number of age groups; K is total capital; and Y is real output. 
Equation (1) is a general specification. In order to operationalise this relationship, we 
assume a translog cost function. Applying Shephard‟s lemma on the assumed translog 
functional form, labour cost share equations for each category of workers can be derived as: 
 
                               
1 1
ln ln
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jitwa is the wage bill of age group j  in industry i and time t ; itWT is the total wage bill of the 
same industry; jitpa  is the wage rate of the jth age group; 1itpa  is the wage of the baseline age 
group; and it  is the usual error term.  
The capital-output ratio captures the degree of capital-skill complementarity. The 
existing evidence suggests the presence of capital-skill complementarity  0k  for skilled 
workers (see, among others, Machin and Van Reenen, 1998; Chun, 2003). Based on the 
existing literature, the impact of technological change on the wage premium can be examined 
by augmenting equation (2) with an indicator of technology. Following O‟Mahony et al. (2008), 
we use the ratio of ICT capital over total capital 
i
ICT
K
 
 
 
 as a technology indicator and re-
write equation (2) as follows: 
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(3)  
 
In equation (3), following the existing literature (e.g., see Chun, 2003 and O‟Mahony et 
al., 2008) and to avoid the endogeneity problem, the relative wage term has been replaced by 
time dummies  tD . Technology is age biased in favour of young worker groups if
 
0IT   for 
the young groups and 0IT   for the older groups.
8
 As discussed earlier, the expected effect on 
the senior groups could be positive or negative. The empirical analysis presented in this paper 
allows one to identify the actual direction of the impact of technology on the demand for 
workers in different age groups (i.e., young, senior and older). This paper sheds new light on 
the skill and gender biases of technology on the demand for older workers. 
Heywood and Siebert (2009) argue that, historically, older workers in most countries 
have not been allowed to work and receive pension income at the same time. Pension rules 
discourage on-going relationships with existing employers. This is problematic, because some 
older workers may be highly valuable to firms that have incurred significant costs in hiring and 
training of these workers. Taxation laws in European countries tend to reduce hiring 
                                                     
8
 Related studies that focus on the skill or gender bias of ICT have used a similar approach. ICT is skill-biased in 
favour of the high skilled group if 0IT  for the high skilled group and 0IT   for the intermediate and 
unskilled groups. Similarly, ICT is gender-biased in favour of females if 0IT   for the female older groups and 
0IT  for the male older groups. 
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opportunities and earnings for older workers, especially when wage setting is rigid (Hurd, 1996; 
Blau and Shvydko, 2011). Often, older workers are forced to retire early with low pensions. 
Labour market institutions that tend to be unfriendly towards older workers could make older 
workers more vulnerable to skill-biased changes in demand. 
In order to disentangle the effect of skill-biased demand arising from institutional 
factors, we augment equation (3) with labour market institution variables extracted from the 
Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts 
database (ICTWSS, Visser 2015; Jansen 2014).
9
 We include seven labour market institution 
variables to capture the effect of institutional setting and restrictions: (i) Coordination of wage-
setting (COORD, which varies on a scale of 0 to 5 with 0 = fragmented wage bargaining and 5 
= extensively regulated wage bargaining; Kenworthy, 2001); (ii) Mandatory extension of 
collective agreements to non-organized employers (EXT, which varies from 0 = no mandatory 
extension or functional equivalent to 3 = virtually automatic and general extension); (iii) 
National Minimum Wage (NMW, which varies from 0 = No statutory minimum wage to 2 = 
Statutory national minimum wage); (iv) Social pact on wage issues (WAGE, 0 = no, 1 = yes);
10
 
(v) Social pact on old age/retirement pensions (PENSIONS, 0 = no, 1 = yes); (vi) Union density 
rate (UD) and (vii) Summary measure of centralisation of wage bargaining (CENT, 0-1; 
Iversen, 1999). The choice of labour market institution variables is dictated by data availability 
for all nine countries. 
The labour demand equation incorporating the labour market institution variables is as 
follows:
11
   
 
                                                     
9
 In a recent study, Conti and Sulis (2016) make an important contribution to the literature that deals with the 
impact of labour market regulations. Specifically, using data from several European countries, Conti and Sulis 
focus on the role that labour market regulations play in shaping the relationship between technology adoption and 
economic growth. 
 
10
 Social pacts are defined as “… publicly announced formal policy contracts between the government and social 
partners over income, labour market or welfare policies that identify explicit policy issues and targets, means to 
achieve them, and tasks and responsibilities of the signatories…” (Avdagic et al., 2011: p.11). This excludes (a) 
tacit understandings or agreements that are not publicly announced; (b) bilateral agreements between employer 
organizations and trade unions that do not involve government as a negotiating party, even if the implementation 
requires legislative action or government support; and (c) the so-called symbolic or declaratory pacts that do not 
commit the negotiating parties to specific tasks and responsibilities (Visser, 2015). 
 
11
 While we are extremely grateful to an anonymous reviewer for highlighting the role of differential changes in 
the statutory and effective retirement ages, compulsory education legislation and the expansion of higher 
education on skill biased demand for older workers across countries, due to lack of appropriate data, we are unable 
to explicitly take these factors into account. We believe that the time dummies and labour market institution 
variables included in our empirical model should capture at least some of the effect of these factors. We have 
however highlighted this issue as an area for further research towards the end of the conclusion.  
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In this paper, we mainly focus on the skill-biased labour demand (as measured by labour 
compensation shares by gender, age and education) for older workers. Caselli and Coleman 
(2006) however, emphasize that the skill-biased nature of technology helps in explaining the 
dramatic change in the relative supply of skill, as well as the skill premium when skilled and 
unskilled labour are imperfect substitutes. In a recent study, using data from the US 
manufacturing sector, Mallick and Sousa (2017) show that improvements in technology have a 
positive effect on skilled-to-unskilled labour and wage ratios. Thus, it is highly pertinent to link 
our work with the SBTC literature that focuses on relative wages (Autor et al., 1998). In order 
to accomplish this task, the left-hand side of equation (4) can be re-written as follows:  
jit jit jit jit jit
it it it it it
wa pa Ea pa Ea
WT pT ET pT ET
      
       
      
                                          (5) 
where jitpa  and itpT , respectively, are the average wage of the age group j in industry i  and 
the average wage of all age groups in the same industry. 
Equation (5) shows that labour compensation share jit
it
wa
WT
 
 
 
 of the age group j in 
industry i can be decomposed into relative wage jit
it
pa
pT
 
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 
and employment share 
jit
it
Ea
ET
 
 
 
 of the age group j in industry i .In equation (3), changes in the relative wage or 
employment shares are captured by the time dummies; similarly, we now specify the relative 
wage and employment share equations as follows: 
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Equations (6) and (7) can be used to separately examine the impact of ICT on relative 
wage and employment shares. 
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3. Data description 
A comprehensive analysis of labour demand by country and industry is now possible 
following the construction of the EU-KLEMS labour and capital accounts database. (See 
O‟Mahony and Timmer, 2009 for details. The analysis presented in this section is based on 
data collected from nine EU countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Finland, Germany, 
Italy, the Netherlands and the UK). These countries are selected mainly because of the 
availability of data on the relevant variables. Specifically, data on labour composition cross-
classified by gender, age and education are available in EU-KLEMS. Based on Afonso‟s (2016) 
country categorization with a focus on labour market institutions, our sample includes four 
Continental Europe countries (Austria, Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands), two Nordic 
countries (Denmark and Finland), two Mediterranean countries (Italy and Spain) and one 
Anglo-Saxon country (the UK). 
The panel data used in this paper are based on 11 industries that together make up the 
market economy and employs the EU-KLEMS  industry division into agriculture, forestry and 
fishing (AtB); ICT producing industries including computing equipment, electrical and 
electronic equipment, instruments and telecommunications equipment and services (ELECOM); 
a three way split of the remainder of manufacturing into consumer goods (Mcons), 
intermediate goods (Minter) and investment goods (Minves); a group combining mining, 
utilities and construction (Other G); wholesale and retail trade (50t52); transport (60t63); 
financial services (J); business services (71t74) and personal services including hotels and 
catering (PERS).  
Output is approximated by real value added and the capital measure is divided into ICT 
and non-ICT components, using Törnqvist capital services indices comprising three assets 
categories within ICT capital (computer, software and communications equipment) and three 
within non-ICT capital (structures, non-ICT equipment and vehicles). Capital stocks are 
estimated for each asset using the perpetual inventory method, assuming exponential 
depreciation with rates that vary across industries but are assumed to be identical in the same 
industry in the nine countries (Timmer et al., 2007a). Indices of capital services were then 
derived by weighting the growth rate of each asset type by its share in the nominal value of 
total capital services employing user costs rather than asset acquisition prices. The investment 
data for computers already incorporates a hedonic adjustment.
12
   
                                                     
12
 The EUKLEMS uses one set of asset depreciation rates that vary across asset type and industry but not across 
countries and over time (Fraumeni, 1997). There are 9 asset types in the capital account of which three assets are 
ICT assets: Computing equipment, Communications equipment and Software. Depreciation rates for non-ICT 
11 
 
In addition, wage and employment data broken down by gender, education and age levels 
were derived from national micro data sources, such as Labour Force Surveys (see O‟Mahony 
and Timmer, 2009, for details). A direct comparison of skill levels is difficult in an 
international context since training and educational systems vary cross countries. We divide 
employees into three groups: high (with college degrees and above), intermediate (with 
education or training qualifications below a college degree) and unskilled (no qualification). 
The age dimension is also categorized into three groups: young (15-29), senior (30-49) and 
older (50 and above). Table 1a presents descriptive statistics of the labour compensation 
variables of older workers from 1970-2007. Due to unavailability of data for older workers, the 
time periods for wage shares differ across countries (1970-2007 for Finland, Italy and the UK; 
1979-2007 for the Netherlands; 1980-2007 for Austria, Belgium, Denmark and Spain; and 
1991-2007 for Germany). These results are weighted by average employee compensation 
(COMP) share of each industry over the period 1970-2007, which is a standard approach to 
take account of industry heterogeneity (O‟Mahony and Peng, 2009). 
 
(Insert Table 1a-b around here) 
 
Older males have the highest wage shares in Spain (20.5%), followed by Germany 
(18.2%), the Netherlands (17.8%) and Denmark (17.4%). In other countries, older males 
account for around 15% of total wage bills except that the wage share of older males in Italy is 
only 5.4%. Compared with males, wage shares of older females are much lower (1% to 6.6%), 
which may be related to lower statutory pensionable ages (SPA) for females (Carmichael and 
Ercolani, 2014). Italy still has the smallest wage share (1%) for older females, suggesting low 
labour participation of older workers (Peng and Siebert, 2008).  
Similarly, employment shares (measured by work hours (Timmer et al., 2007a) of older 
males are also higher in Spain, Germany, the Netherlands and Denmark, and lower in Italy. 
Relative wages of older males exceed 1, suggesting higher wages than the average wage within 
the same industry. The only exception to this is Italy, where older male wages are about 30% 
below the average wage. In Austria and the UK, respectively, the relative wage of older 
                                                                                                                                                                        
assets by industry are shown in Appendix Table 1 in Timmer et al. 2007a. The rates for other machinery, 
transportation equipment and non-residential buildings differ by industry. The depreciation rate for residential 
structures is set to 0.014. The three ICT assets are assumed to have the same depreciation rate for all industries. 
These were set equal to the rates employed in Jorgenson et al. (2006), i.e. 0.315 for computers and software and 
0.115 for communications equipment. The rate for other immaterial assets was set equal to software, infrastructure 
to non-residential buildings, and products of agriculture and other products to other machinery and equipment 
(van Ark et al. 2008). 
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females is 1.1 and 1.0. The relative wage of older females in Italy is the lowest (0.6) and the 
same applies to the employment share (2.3%). It will therefore be interesting to analyse the 
variation in labour compensation shares across countries by decomposing this variation into 
employment share and relative wage variations. Lower employment shares combined with 
lower relative wages, as evident in Italy, might reflect worsening labour demand for older 
workers.  
Table 1b presents descriptive statistics of capital-output and ICT capital-total capital 
ratios over the period 1970-2007 (1976-2007 for Austria). The average capital-output ratio is 
the highest in Austria (58.8%), followed by Belgium (53.7%) and Italy (51%). Spain (32.9%), 
the UK (34.8%), the Netherlands (39.2%) and Germany (39.4%) have the lowest capital-output 
ratios. At the country level, we find a broad negative correlation between capital-output ratio 
and wage shares of older workers. Specifically, countries with higher capital-output ratios are 
more likely to employ fewer older workers or pay lower wages and vice versa. For example, 
Spain has the lowest capital-output ratio among these countries as well as the highest wage 
share of older males. On the other hand, Italy has the lowest wage share for both males and 
females but it is among the top three countries for capital-output ratio. Thus, at the country 
level, there is evidence of a substitution (or skill-biased) effect involving older workers - labour 
is being substituted for capital. 
Skill-biasedness of technology is examined by means of the average ICT capital to total 
capital ratio, which is highest in the UK (10.3%) and lowest in Italy (4.4%). A positive 
correlation between skill-biased technology and the wage shares of older males is found for 
these countries. This positive correlation also broadly fits the situation of older females. For 
example, Italy has the slowest adoption speed for ICT as well as the lowest level of wage 
shares. Spain, with a relatively high ICT ratio has the highest wage share of older males. Thus, 
there is a complementary or deskilling effect of ICT capital on the demand for older workers at 
the country level.
13
  
Table 1b also presents descriptive statistics of the labour market institution variables. 
Highly coordinated wage setting exists in all Continental and Nordic countries (COORD ≥ 
                                                     
13 The definition of ICT assets has not been completely harmonized across the EU. In some countries, IT is 
defined broadly as office and computing equipment, whereas others used a more narrowly defined category of 
computers only. Similarly, CT investment in some countries is defined as investment in all products with electrical 
components and radio/television transmitters/receivers, while others also include insulated wire and cable, 
instruments and appliances for measuring, checking, testing, navigating and other purposes. While harmonization 
is highly desirable, it may be hard to achieve it unless detailed information on all types of investments is made 
available by all countries but serious differences in definitions remain (Timmer et al. 2007 a and b). 
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3.68), but it is relatively weak in the Mediterranean and Anglo-Saxon countries (COORD ≤ 
3.1). There seems to be little or no legal provision for mandatory extension of collective 
agreements to non-organised employers in the Mediterranean and Anglo-Saxon countries (EXT 
≤ 0.29) but extension is virtually automatic in Continental and Nordic countries (EXT ≥ 1), 
with two exceptions of Denmark (EXT = 0) and Spain (EXT = 3). Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Spain and the UK have a national minimum wage (NMW > 0). Regarding social pacts in 
Europe, Table 1b shows that the social pact in Finland is highly likely to be about wage issues 
(WAGE = 0.34). A social pact on old age/retirement pensions is likely only in Belgium 
(PENSIONS = 0.13) and the Netherlands (PENSIONS=0.08).  Compared to other countries 
included in our sample, the two Nordic countries of Denmark (73.14%) and Finland (70.71%) 
have much higher union density (UD). Wage bargaining is relatively more centralised in all 
Continental and Nordic countries (CENT ≥ 0.44) but it is relatively weak in the Mediterranean 
and Anglo-Saxon countries (CENT ≤ 0.33). With a long history of evolution, labour market 
institutions exhibit a complex pattern in European countries but, in general, we can say that the 
labour markets of Continental and Nordic countries are more regulated than those of the 
Mediterranean and Anglo-Saxon countries. 
 
(Insert Figure 1 about here) 
 
It is however worth pointing out that cross-country comparison of the averages tends to 
ignore the dynamics of the long-term unbalanced panel data for each country and may lead to 
misleading conclusions. Figure 1 shows the evolution of wage shares (in %) for workers aged 
50 and above in each country. We find a down-and-up trend in most countries. This pattern 
suggests worsening labour market conditions for older male workers during the 1970s and 
1980s as Europe started to experience the population aging phenomenon (Carmichael and 
Ercolani, 2014). However, there is evidence of some recovery during the 1990s, which 
continues into the 2000s, surpassing the 1980s level. Especially after 1990, there is a fast 
acceleration in wage shares of older workers in all Continental, Nordic and Anglo-Saxon 
countries. This evidence suggests the presence of a structural break around 1990 in the wage 
shares of older males in these countries. In contrast to the acceleration in other countries after 
1990, the declining periods in the two Mediterranean countries (Italy and Spain) lasted till the 
2000s. There is evidence of a long-term worsening of the wage shares of older workers in Italy 
and Spain. 
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(Insert Figure 2 about here) 
 
In the same vein, the simple averages presented in Table 1b cannot adequately capture 
the significant increase in investment in new technology after 2000 (see Figure 2). In the last 
year of our sample, the ICT capital ratios have been up to 30% in Denmark and the UK, 25% 
in Belgium, Finland and Netherlands, which is consistent with fast adoption of new ICT 
technology. Austria, Spain and Germany experienced a slower but steady adoption of new 
technology (up to 20%) over the last forty years. As expected, Italy had the lowest growth in 
ICT capital ratios (less than 10%). The UK, the Netherlands and Scandinavian countries are the 
leaders when it comes to absorption of new technology, while the continental European 
countries joined the ICT revolution at a later stage (Basu et al., 2003; Van ark et al., 2008). 
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Aggregated data for all nine EU countries 
Wage share equations specified in equation (3) were estimated for all age groups in each 
country using a fixed effect estimator (FE) that controls for industry, year and country fixed 
effects. Following the existing studies (e.g., Kahn and Lim, 1998 and Chun, 2003), these 
regressions were weighted by average employee compensation (COMP) share of each industry 
over the period 1970-2007. This allows one to take account of industry heterogeneity. We also 
control clustering of observations at the country and industry level that affects standard errors. 
Results from fixed effect regressions across the entire sample are presented in Table 2. 
For young workers (15-29 years old), capital appears to be a substitute for males even 
when they have higher educational attainment; the estimated coefficients of the high and 
intermediate-skilled workers, respectively, are -0.349 and -1.28. However, the impact of the 
capital-output ratio on the wage share of female workers is statistically insignificant, possibly 
due to earnings rigidity of young females in Europe. The estimated coefficient of the 
technology term suggests that ICT increases the wage shares of the highly skilled young male 
workers (0.155) at the expense of unskilled workers (-1.767). The estimated effect of ICT on 
the wage share of highly skilled young females is positive and significant; the estimated 
coefficient is 0.106, but the impact on intermediate-skilled young females is negative and 
significant (-0.909). The wage share of unskilled young female workers appears to be 
unaffected by ICT. 
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(Insert Table 2 about here) 
 
In the case of senior workers (30-49 years old), the estimated results concerning the 
impact of the capital-output ratio on the wage shares are mixed. For the high-skilled group, 
capital appears to be complementary for females with an estimated coefficient of 0.549 but is 
insignificant for males. The reverse is true for the unskilled group with a significant positive on 
the male wage share (1.734) but an insignificant effect on the female wage share. The 
estimated results presented in Table 2 suggest that ICT increases the wage share of both high 
and intermediate-skilled males (0.545 and 2.722) at the expense of unskilled males (-1.054). 
ICT also increases the wage share of high-skilled senior female workers (0.313), but its impact 
on the wage share of intermediate and unskilled senior female workers is statistically 
insignificant. 
We now turn our attention to older workers (50 and older). The results presented in the 
bottom panel of Table 2 suggest that the impact of the capital-output ratio on the wage share of 
older high-skilled female workers is positive and statistically significant; the estimated 
coefficient is 0.139. ICT capital increases the wage shares of highly skilled males (0.274) at the 
expense of unskilled males (-0.459). However, in the case of older female workers, ICT 
increases the wage shares of both high and intermediate-skill workers (0.069 and 0.186).  
The FE estimation results presented in Table 2 support the idea that ICT and high skill 
are complementary. For all nine countries, ICT has a negative impact on the wage shares of 
unskilled workers. However, in the case of high and intermediate skill groups, this impact 
tends to be positive. We generally observe a positive relationship between technology and skill, 
although the skill-biased demand is much stronger in the case of senior workers than for young 
and older workers, which is consistent with the results in Autor et al. (1998).   
 
4.2 GMM estimation 
The FE estimation results presented so far assume exogenous technology. Due to 
difficulty in finding an appropriate instrument for technology, a large number of existing 
studies have relied on this assumption (e.g., see Berman et al., 1994; Autor et al., 1998; and 
Chun 2003). In this section, we present the results of Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) 
estimation, where lagged values of the explanatory variables are used as instruments (Baum et 
al., 2003).
14
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 The use of lagged values is not ideal but it represents an improvement over FE estimation.  
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GMM estimation involves the use of instrumental variables (IV), which must satisfy two 
requirements: the instrument must be correlated with the included endogenous variables but 
orthogonal to the error term. Given that we are using lagged values of the explanatory variables, 
the first requirement is likely to be met. The orthogonality requirement is checked with an over 
identification test (Hansen j statistic) in the presence of heteroskedasticity. This is a test for the 
joint hypotheses of correct model specification and the orthogonality conditions. The null 
hypothesis is that all instruments are valid. A rejection of the null hypothesis implies that the 
instruments are not satisfying the required orthogonality conditions. After GMM estimation, 
we also calculate what Hayashi (2000) calls the C statistic (also known as the difference-in-
Sargan statistic). This test is used to determine the exogeneity of the endogenous regressors, 
which allows one to establish the usefulness of the GMM method.
15
 As with the case of FE 
estimation, we correct the heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors for the clustering of 
observations at the country*industry level in the GMM estimation. The Hansen J statistic and 
the C statistic are also robust to clustering. 
 
(Insert Table 3 about here) 
 
 Results for the GMM estimation are presented in Table 3. These results are not 
significantly different from the ones presented in Table 2. In general, the GMM estimation also 
supports the skill-biased technical change hypothesis in that ICT favours high skilled, female 
or senior workers. In all estimated equations, the Hansen J statistic is insignificant. Hence, we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis of orthogonality between the instrumental variables and the 
error term. However, while the GMM estimation leads to some gain in consistency, compared 
to FE estimation, it also reduces the efficiency of the estimates. The gain in consistency must 
be balanced against the loss in efficiency. At the 10% significance level, there is insufficient 
evidence to reject the null hypothesis associated with the C statistic, suggesting that the use of 
GMM will lead to loss in efficiency. Therefore, in the remainder of this paper, we present only 
FE estimation results. 
 
4.3 ICT and wage shares of older workers in each of the nine countries 
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 The null hypothesis of the C-test is that the FE estimator is efficient and consistent. Failure to reject the null 
hypothesis implies that FE estimates are preferred over the GMM estimates. 
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The results presented so far are based on data pooled across countries and industries. 
Although dummy variables were included to account for both fixed effects, it is possible that 
the impact of this diversity was not fully captured. Accordingly, we also separately estimated 
the wage share equation for each country. The empirical results concerning the impact of ICT 
capital on the wage shares of older workers are reported in Table 4.
16
 These results (i.e., the 
estimated coefficients of the ICT-Total Capital ratio) suggest that, in a number of EU countries, 
the technology is significantly biased against high-skilled older workers in the sense that an 
increase in ICT capital decreases the wage share of these workers. For example, the estimated 
coefficients for Belgium and Germany for older males, respectively, are -1.523 and -0.87, 
whereas for Danish females the estimated coefficient is -0.182. The age dimension reflects the 
skilled-biased demand not measured by the education dimension. In the case of Belgium, 
Germany and Denmark, technology appears to have a negative impact on the wage shares of 
older workers even though these workers are highly educated.  
Skill-biased demand against older workers is also found in the intermediate-skilled 
groups: Germany (-1.906) for males, Belgium (-0.807), Denmark (-0.669) and Germany (-
0.477) for females. ICT has a negative impact on the wage share of unskilled female workers in 
the Netherlands (-0.166). These results are consistent with existing studies (e.g., see Caroli and 
Van Reenen, 2001; and Goux and Maurin, 2000). It has been argued that the combined effect 
of wage rigidity and a high unemployment rate, as well as the increasing number of low-skilled 
jobs held by highly educated over-qualified workers can lead to this outcome (Pierrard and 
Sneessen, 2003 and Barros et al. 2011). There is also some evidence that employment 
protection legislation (EPL) has an adverse effect on firms that innovate. Labour market 
institutions make it very hard for such firms to adjust their skill composition (Pierre and 
Scarpetta, 2006). It is therefore difficult to observe technology driven responses to demand for 
skills. 
 
(Insert Table 4 about here) 
 
Table 4 shows that the impact of ICT on wage shares of highly skilled older workers is 
insignificant or significantly negative. However, in the case of the pooled data, as reported in 
Table 2, we found a significant positive relationship between the two variables. It seems that 
the positive effect reported in Table 2 was mainly due to cross-country variations, which could 
                                                     
16
 Full results are available to interested readers upon request. 
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be attributed to labour market rigidities such as EPL. It is generally believed that strict EPL 
inhibits labour market flexibility by reducing the ability of the firms to adjust the workforce 
during changing economic conditions (Zhou, 2006). In contrast to the high-skilled older 
workers, ICT has a positive impact on wage shares of unskilled older workers in Austria (males, 
0.647) and Germany (males, 1.055 and females, 0.845). Therefore, as noticed in the descriptive 
statistics presented in Table 1 a-b, there is a complementary or deskilling effect of ICT capital 
on the demand for older workers. 
 
4.4 The impact of technology on older workers over time 
In Table 4, we find evidence of significant deskilling among older workers in Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark and Germany. Our empirical analysis suggests that highly skilled older 
workers have been replaced by unskilled older workers. Historically, changes in technology 
have been associated with deskilling of the labour force over time.
17
 The substitution of 
machines for skilled labour during the industrial revolution and the move towards Fordist 
manufacturing techniques in the 1950s are the most widely cited examples (e.g., see Goldin 
and Katz, 1998; and O‟Mahony et al., 2008). Are similar processes at work in the case of ICT? 
It could be argued that much of the observed skill bias may be a short-term adoption effect. As 
the new technology becomes fully integrated into the production process, firms can replace the 
high-wage, highly educated young and senior workers with low-paid, less-educated older 
workers. Within the older worker groups, it is also possible to substitute high-skilled workers 
with their unskilled counterparts.  
The aim of this section is to focus on possible changes in the impact of technology over 
time. Using a structural break test, we split the full sample into two sub-samples in terms of the 
time periods. Using the sub-samples, we analyse the differences in the relevant estimated 
coefficients over time. If technology is deskilling, we would observe a shift in labour demand 
from highly skilled to lower skilled (i.e., intermediate and low-skilled) workers. This shift in 
demand for workers is likely to result in a shift in the impact of technology in our wage shares 
equation estimates.  
In order to examine whether or not the impact of ICT on older workers in each of the 
nine EU countries is de-skilling, we focus on changes in the estimated coefficient of ICT in our 
wage share equation over time. We use a two-step approach: first, we test for structural breaks 
in the country-level data and second, we re-estimate equation (3) taking the structural breaks 
                                                     
17
 An interesting discussion of how and why deskilling occurs can be found in Piore (1979). 
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into account. The econometric literature on structural break tests for panel data is still evolving 
and no formalised tests are readily available. We follow Stiroh (2002) and O‟Mahony et al. 
(2008) in testing the aggregated data for a break and then use the results to re-estimate the 
wage share equation for the subsamples. We then analyse the changes in the relevant estimated 
coefficients over time. In order to identify the break date, we use the Quandt Likelihood Ratio 
(QLR) test (also known as the “sup-Wald” statistic), which is a modified version of the Chow 
test for structural change. The breakpoint is defined as the maximum value of the statistic with 
the null hypothesis of no structural change in the middle range of the data (15%-85% range 
with 15% trimming).  
 
(Insert Table 5 about here) 
 
Results of the estimated breakpoints for each country are reported in Table 5. We find 
that the breakpoints differ across countries and skill groups, which is in line with a priori 
expectations, given the heterogeneity in the cross-country data. This heterogeneity can be 
largely attributed to differing economic and institutional factors. The null hypothesis of no 
structural break can be rejected for all gender/education groups of older workers in all nine 
countries. Except for Germany, the Netherlands and the UK with only one maximum value, 
two local maximum values of the QLR statistic were found in the case of all other countries, 
suggesting two breakpoints. This could be attributed to, among other things, rigidity of the 
wage setting arrangements, the impact of new technology and differences in the speed of 
technology adoption. In this paper, we also address the trade-off between the alleged decrease 
in learning capabilities (damaging older workers) and the increase in experience and seniority 
(in favour of older workers). The structural breaks in deskilling arise not only from the 
codification and standardization of new technology but also from the change in labour supply. 
Exposure to the ICT on the part of the young and senior workers in the 1970s and 1980s could 
have helped them become more adaptable to new technology in their later career as they 
became older workers in the 1990s and 2000s (Messinis and Ahmed, 2013; Barros et al., 
2011).
18
  
Using the estimates of the break points, we re-estimate equation (3) after interacting 
each variable with appropriate time dummies to capture the structural break. For each country, 
we use the average of the break-dates of all gender/education groups of older workers. It 
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 We are grateful to a referee for bringing this issue to our attention. 
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appears that Finland experienced structural breaks from the impact of new technology much 
earlier (around 1984 and 1994) than other countries (around 1990 or 2000). In the case of 
Germany, we found one structural break around 2003.
19
 The findings of this re-estimation are 
presented in Table 6, where we continue to focus on the estimated coefficients of ICT/K for 
older workers group over different time periods. 
 
(Insert Table 6 about here) 
 
The empirical results presented in Table 6 show an increasing skill-biased impact of 
technology on the wage share of the highly skilled older male workers in Denmark (0.266 and 
0.719) and Germany (0.381), as well as female workers in Belgium (0.114 and 0.346), 
Denmark (0.257), Finland (0.364 and 1.958), Germany (0.144) and the UK (0.313). The skill-
biased labour demand for new technology is also reflected in the negative impact on wage 
shares of unskilled old female workers in Austria (-0.557), the Netherlands (-0.164) and the 
UK (-0.597), and for male workers in Germany (-0.327). The impact of technological change 
on wage shares increases particularly in the later years of our sample (i.e., during the 2000s).  
The deskilling effect of new technology is evident in the results presented in Table 6; the 
demand for highly skilled (unskilled) older workers is decreasing (increasing). The effect of 
new technology becomes significantly negative for high skilled older males (the relevant 
estimated coefficient for Belgium is -1.53; Finland -0.31 and Germany -0.889) and females 
(with an estimated coefficient for Denmark is -0.096). At the same time, it is interesting to note 
that the wage share of unskilled older workers has increased with ICT in many countries: for 
males, the estimated value of the relevant coefficient is 0.876 for Austria; 0.703 for Belgium; 
0.614 for Finland; 1.076 for Germany; 0.141, 0.337 and 0.612 for Italy. In the case of the 
females, the estimated value of the relevant coefficient is 0.745 for Spain; 0.849 for Germany. 
Therefore, we can conclude that the skill-biased demand is evident for the older workers in 
Denmark, the Netherlands and the UK, while in Spain and Italy, the evidence of deskilling is 
widely observed. For other European countries (such as Austria, Belgium, Finland and 
Germany), skill-biased or deskilling labour demand from new technology varies by gender and 
over different time periods, suggesting heterogeneous patterns of adaptation to new 
technologies.  
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 The required data on all variables for Germany is not available before 1991 due to reunification. 
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4.5 Skill biased demand and labour market institutions   
In this section, we extend the empirical model to include labour market institution 
variables. Specifically, we attempt to examine the impact of labour market institutions on skill-
biased demand for older workers, which involves estimation of equation (4). The estimated 
results are reported in Table 7.  
Compared to the estimates without labour market institution variables presented at the 
bottom panel of Table 2, we find that our basic conclusion concerning the skill-biased demand 
for older workers continues to hold. The impact of the capital-output ratio on the wage share of 
older workers is still positive and statistically significant only in the case of high-skilled 
females with an estimated coefficient of 0.132. ICT capital decreases the wage shares of 
unskilled males (-0.557) but the estimated coefficient on ICT capital on high-skilled males is 
now statistically insignificant. In the case of older female workers, ICT capital increases the 
wage shares of both high-skilled (0.064) and unskilled workers (0.253) but the impact on the 
intermediate-skilled workers is statistically insignificant. Thus, once we take labour market 
institutions into account, ICT continues to favours high-skilled female workers, but the 
deskilling effect on unskilled females is more significant.  
 
(Insert Table 7 about here) 
 
The labour market institution variables show a complicated pattern in cross-country 
regressions. For example, coordination of wage setting (COORD) decreases the wage shares of 
highly skilled males (-0.084) but its effect is statistically insignificant for all other groups. 
Extension of collective agreements (EXT), social pact on pensions (PENSIONS) and 
centralisation of wage bargaining (CENT) appear to have a negative impact on wage shares of 
highly skilled older workers, or a positive effect on wage shares of unskilled workers. It can be 
argued that strong labour market institutions can alleviate the adverse effect of the skill biased 
demand on wage shares of older unskilled workers.
20
 The impact of a national minimum wage 
(NMW), social pact on wage issues (WAGE) and union density (UD) on wage shares of high 
and intermediate-skilled older workers is positive, which supports the skill-biased demand for 
older skilled workers.   
 
4.6 Sensitivity test using relative wages and employment share as dependent variables   
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 This result is consistent with Acemoglu et al. (2001), Peng and Kang (2013) and Kristal and Cohen (2016) who 
have reported that labour market regulation can depress wage inequality. 
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So far, we have used the labour compensation shares as the dependent variable. In order 
to link our work with SBTC literature (see towards the end of Section 2), we decomposed the 
labour compensation shares into employment and relative wages. To test the SBTC hypothesis, 
the skill-biased effect on relative wages has to be disentangled from the changes in 
employment shares (Autor et al., 1998; Mallick and Sousa, 2017). Table 8 presents the 
estimated results when relative wages of older workers are used as the dependent variable as 
specified in equation (6). The impact of the capital-output ratio on relative wages of older 
workers is positive and significant only in the case of unskilled males with an estimated 
coefficient of 0.335. ICT capital increases the relative wages of unskilled males (0.091) and 
females (0.073), but the impact on high and intermediate-skilled workers is statistically 
insignificant. Based on the results presented in Table 8, it seems that the SBTC hypothesis is 
invalid in the case of the countries in our sample.  
 
(Insert Table 8 about here) 
 
Compared to the estimates of labour compensation shares, the relative wages of older 
workers exhibit a deskilling trend. Specifically, the impact of ICT capital ratios on relative 
wages of unskilled workers is positive and statistically significant. It follows that, the skill-
biased demand for older workers arises due to decreasing employment shares of unskilled older 
workers and increasing employment shares of high-skilled older workers. In order to formally 
test this hypothesis, equation (7) is estimated, where the employment shares are the dependent 
variables. The estimated results, as shown in Table 9, are qualitatively similar to those 
presented in Table 7, where the labour compensation shares are the dependent variables. The 
estimated coefficient of the ICT capital is larger in magnitude (-0.69 for unskilled males; 0.091 
for high skilled females). Our results are consistent with Mitchell (2005), who argues that even 
with an increasing demand for skilled labour over time, specialization is deskilling. Mallick 
and Sousa (2017) show that technology has become more favourable to skilled workers in the 
US since the 1980s and this has resulted in relative abundance of skilled workers.  
 
(Insert Table 9 about here) 
 
The results presented in Tables 8 and 9 show that new technology increases the 
employment shares as well as relative wages of only unskilled older female workers. The 
deskilling demand for unskilled older females suggests that unskilled female-dominant services 
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such as the hospitality, nursing assistants, primary teaching assistants and community care are 
complementary to new technology. ICT might be adopted in more codified and standardised 
forms to allow unskilled older females to operate in the above-mentioned service sectors. 
These results further corroborate the idea that new technologies are not equally beneficial to all 
industries. In other words, as shown by Mallick and Sousa (2017), the impact of technology is 
subject to some degree of heterogeneity.   
 
4.7 Dynamic specification 
If the wage shares are persistent and path dependent then their adjustment to the shocks 
arising from capital, new technology and labour market institutions may be very slow. In such 
a case, the static empirical model presented in equation (4) is likely to lead to biased and 
inconsistent results (Baltagi and Blien, 1998; Buttner, 1999). Accordingly, in this section, we 
re-estimate our model using a dynamic panel specification that incorporates an error correction 
mechanism (Hamilton, 1994; Ammermuller et al., 2010): 
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(8) 
where the dependent variable (labour compensation share) is in the form of first differences; 
the lagged dependent variable is also among the right-hand side regressors to capture the 
possible inertia of wage shares adjustment. 
Once the dynamic model has been estimated, using some simple parameter restrictions, we 
can test certain hypotheses. For example, when 0w   or insignificant, the impact of new 
technology and institutions can be absorbed by the contemporaneous changes in the wage 
shares and hence the wage shares could not be persistent and path dependent. When 1w   , 
equation (8) reduces to a standard specification of the wage share (see equation (4)). When 
0 1w  , we get a more standard partial adjustment wage share equation.
 
 
The results of dynamic panel estimation are presented in Table 10. The coefficients of the 
lagged wage shares are significant but close to zero, which suggests that wages shares adjust 
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quickly to shocks from capital, new technology and institutions. We still find the skill-biased 
demand for high-skilled older females with an estimated coefficient of 0.005. As the wage 
shares of older workers are not significantly persistent and path dependent, we cannot reject the 
static wage share equation in favour of a dynamic specification. In overall terms, our basic 
results from estimation of equation (4) are robust.   
 
(Insert Table 10 around here) 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
Over the past three decades, population aging has emerged as an important issue, 
especially in the developed countries. At the same time, the world economy has also greatly 
benefitted from technological advances. This paper aims to contribute to the literature that 
deals with the interaction between aging workers and technology. Using a unique industry level 
dataset, we attempt to examine the extent to which skill-biased technological change is evident 
at different points in the age distribution of workers in Europe. The main issue addressed in 
this paper is whether ICT is ultimately deskilling in the longer run and, if it is, does this affect 
older workers more? We also address the issue of whether the skill requirements are different 
in the post-adoption phase of the new technology. We believe that this issue is important as 
Europe, in particular, faces the problem of an aging workforce and yet the use of legislation to 
allow workers to continue past a culturally established retirement age needs to be balanced 
against the likelihood of the obsolescence of worker skills as technology changes. 
We focus on nine European countries, where the number of older workers (aged 50 and 
over) has significantly increased over time. At the same time, the wage share of older workers 
in these countries has also widely fluctuated. We examine the impact of information and 
communication technology (ICT) on the wage shares of high-skilled, intermediate-skilled and 
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unskilled male and female workers. The impact of ICT on the wage share of highly skilled 
male and female workers across all three age groups is positive and significant. 
We also consider the impact of ICT on the wage shares of three age groups of male and 
female workers in each of the nine countries. We find significant differences across countries 
and over time. There is a complementary or deskilling effect of ICT capital on the demand for 
older workers. We also used the Quandt Likelihood Ratio (QLR) test to identify structural 
breaks for all countries over time. We find that skill-biased demand is evident for older 
workers in Denmark, the Netherlands and the UK, while in other European countries, 
especially in Spain and Italy, the evidence of deskilling is widely observed. Thus, either these 
groups of older workers are gradually becoming familiar with the new technology and/or they 
are involved in low skill non-routine tasks that cannot be easily substituted by computers 
(Autor et al., 2003).  
Finally, we considered the impact of labour market institutions on wage shares of older 
workers and found that a national minimum wage, a social pact on wage issues and union 
density mostly benefit skilled workers, while coordination of wage setting, extension of 
collective agreements, a social pact on pensions and centralisation of wage bargaining can 
alleviate the adverse effects of skill-biased demand on the wage shares of older unskilled 
workers. From a policy point of view, our findings highlight the important role that 
governments can play by boosting public sector investment in education and job training 
programs with a focus on information and communication technologies, not only for young 
workers but also for older workers (Barros et al. 2011). Codified and standardized technologies 
can help older workers adapt to fast-changing working conditions and keep their jobs, while 
the trained young workers will be more adaptable to new technologies when they become 
senior and older workers, as can be seen from the structural breaks in the wage shares of older 
worker in our sample in the 1990s and 2000s. The empirical analysis presented in this paper 
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suggests that labour market institutions have a positive impact on the earnings of the older 
workers. However, while examining the impact of these institutions on workers, one must keep 
in mind differing worker skills and industry heterogeneity.  
Future research in this area should be based on improved measures of worker skill 
endowments. Messinis and Ahmed (2013) highlight the significance of cognitive skills as a 
driver of innovation and diffusion, and recommend a new measure of human capital (a 
composite index) that takes into account education, cognitive skill, life expectancy and the use 
of ICT. The proposed composite index could also take into account international test scores 
that allow a comparison of the education quality across countries. Different countries upgrade 
their educational systems at different times, which makes it harder not only to measure but also 
to compare the skill endowments of older workers across countries. In general, one has not 
only to try to reduce the potential but also the extent of the endogeneity problem (Heckman et 
al. 2006). Improved measures that also consider time-varying returns on education, skill 
obsolescence, skill-job mismatch and over-education are highly desirable (Barros et al. 2011).  
Finally, it is worth mentioning that, in this paper, we only provide a suggestive 
interpretation of our estimated results as industry level data do not contain information on 
individual tasks. Further analysis based on micro data could shed more light on these issues. 
The age structure of the population varies across countries and this variation can also affect the 
economic performance of a country. Similarly, different countries upgraded their educational 
systems at different times but we have not taken this into account. The quality of the research 
on skilled biased demand for older workers can also be further improved by taking into account 
the changes in compulsory education legislation and the expansion of higher education across 
countries (e.g., see Marouani and Nilsson, 2016). 
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Figure 1: Wage bill shares for workers aged 50 and over (%) in 9 EU countries 
 
   
   
   
Source: Author calculations based on EU-KLEMS data from 1970 to 2007. 
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Figure 2: Capital-Output and ICT Capital-Total Capital Ratios in 9 EU countries 
   
   
   
Source: Author calculations based on EU-KLEMS data from 1970 to 2007.
 
 
Table 1a: Descriptive Statistics of Labour Compensation Variables (1970-2007)  
Country 
Males 50+ Females 50+ 
Obs 
Labour 
compensation 
shares in % 
Employment 
Shares in % 
Relative 
wage 
Obs 
Labour 
compensation 
shares in % 
Employment 
Shares in % 
Relative 
wage 
Austria*** 308 14.3 11.9 1.2 295 5.0 4.7 1.1 
Belgium*** 308 15.9 13.8 1.2 295 2.4 3.9 0.7 
Denmark*** 308 17.4 16.2 1.1 243 5.8 7.1 0.8 
Spain*** 308 20.5 16.8 1.3 308 3.6 4.7 0.9 
Finland* 418 14.2 11.0 1.4 418 6.6 7.4 0.9 
Germany**** 187 18.2 14.1 1.3 187 5.1 7.3 0.7 
Italy* 418 5.4 9.0 0.7 418 1.0 2.3 0.6 
Netherlands** 319 17.8 14.1 1.3 318 2.6 2.8 0.9 
UK* 418 15.4 12.7 1.7 418 3.1 5.3 1.0 
 
Table 1b: Descriptive Statistics of Capital Ratio, ICT Capital Ratio and Labour Market Institution Variables (1970-2007)  
Country Obs 
Capital/ 
output in % 
ICT/total 
capital 
in  % 
COORD EXT NMW WAGE PENSIONS UD CENT 
Austria† 352 58.8 6.2 4.34 3.00 0.00 0.03 0.03 47.52 0.92 
Belgium 407 53.7 6.3 4.34 3.00 1.74 0.03 0.13 50.74 0.47 
Denmark 418 47.2 8.6 4.11 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.03 73.14 0.52 
Spain 418 32.9 9.0 3.10 3.00 2.00 0.13 0.03 16.43 0.31 
Finland 418 44.2 8.9 4.47 2.76 0.00 0.34 0.05 70.71 0.44 
Germany 418 39.4 8.5 3.68 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 30.48 0.44 
Italy 418 51.0 4.4 2.68 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.05 40.60 0.33 
Netherlands 418 39.2 8.0 3.79 2.00 2.00 0.16 0.08 28.22 0.53 
UK 418 34.8 10.3 1.66 0.29 1.08 0.11 0.00 40.12 0.18 
Source: Author calculation based on EU-KLEMS and ICTWSS database. *Labour compensation data are only available from 1970-2007 for Finland, Italy and the UK; 
**1979-2007 for the Netherlands; ***1980-2007 for Austria, Belgium, Denmark and Spain; ****1991-2007 for Germany.  
†Capital-output and ICT capital-total capital ratios are available for all countries, except Austria over the period 1970-2007. The time period for Austria is 1976-2007.
 
 
Table 2: Estimation of the wage share equations using aggregated data on 11 industries in 9 EU 
countries from1970 to 2007 (country, industry and year dummies are included in all equations)  
Age 15-29 (young workers) 
Dependent  
variable:  
wage shares 
Male Female 
High Intermediate Unskilled High Intermediate Unskilled 
Degree Below degree None Degree Below degree None 
Ln(K/Y) -0.349** -1.280* 0.426 0.223 -0.918 -0.751 
  (0.159) (0.691) (0.690) (0.147) (0.905) (0.457) 
Ln(ICT/K) 0.155** -0.061 -1.767** 0.106** -0.909** -0.357 
  (0.065) (0.301) (0.747) (0.051) (0.449) (0.371) 
R-squared 0.801 0.743 0.597 0.583 0.665 0.503 
N 2973 2981 2974 2956 2976 2971 
Age 30-49 (senior workers) 
Dependent  
variable:  
wage shares 
Male Female 
High Intermediate Unskilled High Intermediate Unskilled 
Degree Below degree None Degree Below degree None 
Ln(K/Y) 0.492 -0.034 1.734** 0.549** -0.040 -0.767 
  (0.511) (1.226) (0.676) (0.257) (0.905) (0.584) 
Ln(ICT/K) 0.545* 2.722*** -1.054** 0.313*** -0.359 0.005 
  (0.313) (0.807) (0.417) (0.104) (0.591) (0.309) 
R-squared 0.799 0.854 0.811 0.684 0.778 0.637 
N 2981 2981 2977 2976 2981 2981 
Age 50+ (older workers) 
Dependent  
variable:  
wage shares 
Male Female 
High Intermediate Unskilled High Intermediate Unskilled 
Degree Below degree None Degree Below degree None 
Ln(K/Y) 0.233 -0.206 0.464 0.139** -0.274 0.132 
  (0.389) (0.551) (0.328) (0.056) (0.190) (0.266) 
Ln(ICT/K) 0.274* 0.102 -0.459** 0.069** 0.186** 0.224 
  (0.153) (0.512) (0.192) (0.027) (0.078) (0.137) 
R-squared 0.682 0.719 0.837 0.454 0.738 0.661 
N 2981 2981 2981 2891 2976 2980 
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are corrected for clustering of observations at the 
country*industry level and shown in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively.  
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Table 3: GMM Estimation of wage equations using aggregated data (country, industry and year 
dummies are included in all equations) 
Age 15-29 (young workers) 
Dependent  
variable:  
wage shares 
Male Female 
High Intermediate Unskilled High Intermediate Unskilled 
Degree Below degree None Degree Below degree None 
Ln(K/Y) -0.286* -0.667 0.100 0.231* -0.480 -0.504 
  (0.157) (0.577) (0.413) (0.125) (0.546) (0.332) 
Ln(ICT/K) 0.130** 0.018 -0.627** 0.087* -0.997*** -0.258 
  (0.065) (0.274) (0.296) (0.048) (0.336) (0.224) 
Hansen J- test 3.85 2.28 8.94 0.60 0.40 0.91 
  (0.146) (0.32) (0.177) (0.739) (0.82) (0.634) 
C statistic 3.03 4.33 1.13 1.11 2.87 2.45 
  (0.22) (0.115) (0.568) (0.574) (0.238) (0.294) 
R-squared 0.804 0.747 0.556 0.585 0.669 0.507 
N 2907 2915 2842 2890 2910 2905 
Age 30-49 (senior workers) 
Dependent  
variable:  
wage shares  
Male Female 
High Intermediate Unskilled High Intermediate Unskilled 
Degree Below degree None Degree Below degree None 
Ln(K/Y) 0.477 0.088 1.587** 0.495** -0.039 0.245 
  (0.440) (1.105) (0.654) (0.245) (0.800) (0.408) 
Ln(ICT/K) 0.396 2.543*** -0.989** 0.284*** -0.447 0.001 
  (0.300) (0.797) (0.415) (0.106) (0.551) (0.261) 
Hansen J-test 1.64 1.54 1.72 1.25 0.05 9.02 
  (0.441) (0.463) (0.422) (0.536) (0.976) (0.173) 
C statistic 2.35 2.27 1.95 2.24 0.33 1.25 
  (0.309) (0.321) (0.378) (0.326) (0.847) (0.536) 
R-squared 0.807 0.853 0.810 0.689 0.780 0.588 
N 2915 2915 2911 2910 2915 2849 
Age 50+ (older workers) 
Dependent  
variable:  
wage shares 
Male Female 
High Intermediate Unskilled High Intermediate Unskilled 
Degree Below degree None Degree Below degree None 
Ln(K/Y) -0.053 -0.226 0.201 0.133*** -0.238 0.291 
  (0.214) (0.484) (0.314) (0.049) (0.162) (0.185) 
Ln(ICT/K) 0.133 0.208 -0.703*** 0.061** 0.234** 0.121 
  (0.132) (0.282) (0.171) (0.028) (0.094) (0.118) 
Hansen J-test 3.22 2.45 7.52 4.45 5.77 3.49 
  (0.521) (0.653) (0.111) (0.348) (0.217) (0.48) 
C statistic 2.57 0.76 2 1.7 1.35 0.72 
  (0.277) (0.683) (0.368) (0.427) (0.51) (0.699) 
R-squared 0.670 0.730 0.832 0.458 0.749 0.635 
N 2882 2882 2882 2792 2844 2881 
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are corrected for clustering of observations at the 
country*industry level and shown in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. The orthogonality requirement is checked with an over-identification test (Hansen J statistic) in the 
presence of heteroskedasticity. The null hypothesis is that all instruments are valid. The C statistic is used to 
determine the exogeneity of the endogenous regressors. The null hypothesis is that the FE estimator is efficient 
and consistent. Failure to reject the null hypothesis implies that the FE estimates are to be preferred to the GMM 
IV estimates.  
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Table 4: Estimated Coefficient on ICT-Total Capital Ratio for Older Workers by Country 
(industry and year dummies are included in all equations) 
Dependent  
variable:  
wage shares 
Male Female 
High Intermediate Unskilled High Intermediate Unskilled 
Degree Below degree None Degree Below degree None 
Austria -0.286 0.767* 0.647** 0.069 -0.032 0.047 
  (0.197) (0.399) (0.278) (0.071) (0.206) (0.324) 
R-squared 0.864 0.861 0.871 0.819 0.711 0.835 
N 308 308 308 295 308 308 
Belgium -1.523*** -2.025 -0.135 -0.159 -0.807* 0.098 
  (0.427) (1.381) (0.757) (0.222) (0.422) (0.211) 
R-squared 0.800 0.585 0.962 0.785 0.704 0.865 
N 297 297 297 286 292 296 
Denmark -0.279 0.107 -1.166 -0.182*** -0.669* 0.312 
  (0.290) (0.773) (0.779) (0.053) (0.359) (0.395) 
R-squared 0.925 0.841 0.825 0.844 0.883 0.834 
N 308 308 308 243 308 308 
Spain 0.394 0.346 0.774 -0.047 0.244* 0.039 
  (0.728) (0.392) (1.012) (0.081) (0.121) (0.850) 
R-squared 0.905 0.886 0.956 0.746 0.754 0.953 
N 308 308 308 308 308 308 
Finland -0.235 0.340 -0.093 -0.086 -0.010 0.060 
  (0.258) (0.412) (0.181) (0.175) (0.100) (0.158) 
R-squared 0.882 0.738 0.931 0.678 0.833 0.876 
N 418 418 418 418 418 418 
Germany -0.870** -1.906* 1.055** 0.156 -0.477** 0.845**  
  (0.329) (0.923) (0.340) (0.088) (0.211) (0.283)    
R-squared 0.959 0.893 0.924 0.908 0.984 0.930 
N 187 187 187 187 187 187 
Italy -0.049 -0.238 0.067 -0.002 -0.079 -0.047 
  (0.055) (0.244) (0.130) (0.005) (0.133) (0.046) 
R-squared 0.929 0.864 0.799 0.741 0.841 0.773 
N 418 418 418 418 418 418 
Netherlands 0.186 2.956 -0.123 0.074 0.334 -0.166* 
  (0.238) (1.978) (0.491) (0.111) (0.373) (0.088) 
R-squared 0.920 0.639 0.887 0.625 0.900 0.815 
N 319 319 319 318 319 319 
UK -0.530 0.733 0.086 -0.053 0.040 0.213 
  (0.578) (2.371) (0.514) (0.081) (0.456) (0.188) 
R-squared 0.886 0.731 0.873 0.692 0.715 0.901 
N 418 418 418 418 418 418 
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are corrected for clustering of observations at the industry level 
and shown in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5: Estimates of the breakpoints for 9 EU countries 
Dependent  
variable:  
wage 
shares 
Male Female 
Average 
High 
Skilled 
Intermediate 
Skilled 
Unskilled 
High 
Skilled 
Intermediate 
Skilled 
Unskilled 
Degree 
Below  
degree 
None Degree 
Below  
degree 
None 
Austria 
  
  
  
1989* 1989*** 1992***   1989***   1990 
4.16 17.50 26.70   14.16     
2003**     2000***   1997*** 2000 
5.48     28.09   31.13   
Belgium 
  
  
  
  1993*** 1992***   1996*** 1992*** 1993 
  45.69  45.65    35.41  26.46    
2003***     2001*** 2000***   2001 
26.63     56.74 36.72     
Denmark 
  
  
  
1992* 1987***     1989***   1989 
4.42 27.72     13.33     
2002***   2003*** 2002***   2003*** 2003 
8.62   15.47 25.80   18.21   
Spain 
  
  
  
1994*   1984***       1989 
4.61   16.77         
  2003***   2003*** 2003*** 2002*** 2003 
  56.39   27.01 78.69 6.16   
Finland 
  
  
  
  1987*** 1982** 1988***   1978*** 1984 
  128.14 5.19 99.22   26.81   
1990***   1999***   1993***   1994 
81.76   6.16   46.64     
Germany 
  
2002*** 2003*** 2004*** 2002*** 2004*** 2004*** 2003 
27.22 17.13 10.46 42.23 43.07 44.74   
Italy 
  
  
  
1987*** 1990*** 1990***     1990*** 1989 
11.07 18.92 48.07     48.31   
2001***     2000*** 2001***   2001 
26.06     47.16 181.20     
Netherlands 
  
1992*** 1994*** 1995*** 1997*** 1998*** 1994*** 1995 
46.51 59.50 272.36 50.91 101.22 36.28   
UK 
  
1991*** 1986*** 1983*** 1995*** 1987*** 1991*** 1989 
29.35 74.80 48.32 49.71 267.33 26.22   
Notes: The Quandt likelihood ratio (QLR test) or sup-Wald statistic is a modified version of the Chow test used to 
identify break dates. The estimated values of the test statistic are reported under the break year in bold and italics. 
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The critical values of QLR statistics 
with 15% trimming and three restrictions (break and its interactions with K/Y and ICT/K) are taken from Stock 
and Watson (2014). 
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Table 6: Estimated Coefficient on ICT-Total Capital Ratio for Older workers (50+) by country 
over time (industry and year dummies are included in all equations) 
Dependent  
variable:  
wage shares 
Male Female 
High 
Skilled 
Intermediate 
Skilled Unskilled 
High 
Skilled 
Intermediate 
Skilled Unskilled 
Degree Below degree None Degree Below degree None 
Austria 
ln(ICT/K)80-90 
-0.127 0.589** 0.876* 0.109 0.009 -0.087 
(0.230) (0.253) (0.395) (0.088) (0.251) (0.247) 
ln(ICT/K)90-00 
0.387 0.015 0.358 0.048 0.164 -0.124 
(0.408) (0.225) (0.307) (0.047) (0.202) (0.136) 
ln(ICT/K)00-07 
0.401 -0.855** 0.774 0.015 0.081 -0.557* 
(0.237) (0.279) (0.531) (0.079) (0.349) (0.281) 
R-squared 0.873 0.881 0.890 0.832 0.714 0.855 
N 308 308 308 295 308 308 
Belgium 
Ln(ICT/K)80-93 
-1.530*** -1.180 -0.565 -0.210 -1.137*** 0.027 
(0.339) (0.986) (0.891) (0.121) (0.315) (0.179) 
Ln(ICT/K)93-01 
0.036 -0.287 0.703** 0.114*** 0.321** 0.075 
(0.212) (0.294) (0.278) (0.029) (0.108) (0.103) 
Ln(ICT/K)01-07 
-0.515 -2.069 0.413 0.346** 0.685* 0.166 
(0.314) (1.791) (0.473) (0.139) (0.388) (0.210) 
R-squared 0.818 0.623 0.967 0.859 0.751 0.867 
N 297 297 297 286 292 296 
Denmark 
Ln(ICT/K)80-89 
-0.041 0.041 -0.634 -0.096** -0.399 0.287    
(0.178) (1.043) (0.548) (0.039) (0.573) (0.388)    
Ln(ICT/K)89-03 
0.266** -0.444 1.155 0.043 0.488 -0.122    
(0.102) (0.913) (0.641) (0.037) (0.328) (0.113)    
Ln(ICT/K)03-07 
0.719** -0.406 1.328 0.257*** 1.037 0.073    
(0.254) (1.200) (1.303) (0.044) (0.800) (0.461)    
R-squared 0.944 0.860 0.856 0.889 0.902 0.846 
N 308 308 308 243 308 308 
Spain 
Ln(ICT/K)80-89 
0.432 0.362 1.013 -0.032 0.287** 0.102    
(0.729) (0.397) (1.060) (0.078) (0.126) (0.750)    
Ln(ICT/K)89-03 
0.201 0.128 -0.350 -0.010 0.013 0.293    
(0.275) (0.130) (0.409) (0.030) (0.048) (0.171)    
Ln(ICT/K)03-07 
0.890 0.358* 0.354 0.134 0.297 0.745**  
(0.654) (0.167) (1.000) (0.133) (0.238) (0.299)    
R-squared 0.912 0.888 0.957 0.796 0.793 0.959 
N 308 308 308 308 308 308 
Finland 
Ln(ICT/K)70-84 
-0.288 -0.109 0.001 0.143 0.196* 0.082 
(0.306) (0.203) (0.199) (0.145) (0.104) (0.133) 
Ln(ICT/K)84-94 
-0.310* -0.316 0.614** 0.364** 0.176 0.071 
(0.168) (0.186) (0.264) (0.143) (0.100) (0.385) 
Ln(ICT/K)94-07 
-0.082 -2.755*** 0.777 1.958** 0.918*** 0.022 
(0.503) (0.583) (0.653) (0.639) (0.250) (0.841) 
R-squared 0.883 0.846 0.942 0.838 0.878 0.875 
N 418 418 418 418 418 418 
Germany 
Ln(ICT/K)91-03 
-0.889*** -1.859** 1.076*** 0.144** -0.509** 0.849**  
(0.266) (0.683) (0.319) (0.057) (0.196) (0.282)    
Ln(ICT/K)03-07 
0.381* 0.907 -0.327* -0.086 -0.003 0.220    
(0.192) (0.712) (0.156) (0.051) (0.093) (0.140)    
R-squared 0.963 0.908 0.929 0.931 0.985 0.935 
N 187 187 187 187 187 187 
Italy 
Ln(ICT/K)70-89 
-0.049 -0.271 0.141** -0.003 -0.107 -0.040 
(0.056) (0.276) (0.046) (0.006) (0.121) (0.040) 
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Ln(ICT/K)89-01 
0.011 -0.084 0.337*** 0.002 -0.010 0.052 
(0.019) (0.126) (0.079) (0.003) (0.053) (0.031) 
Ln(ICT/K)01-07 
0.042 -0.064 0.612*** -0.005 0.009 0.094 
(0.043) (0.366) (0.113) (0.006) (0.112) (0.056) 
R-squared 0.933 0.879 0.932 0.774 0.893 0.802 
N 418 418 418 418 418 418 
Netherlands 
Ln(ICT/K)79-95 
0.307 2.091 -0.134 0.064 0.317 -0.164* 
(0.278) (1.341) (0.428) (0.107) (0.305) (0.084) 
Ln(ICT/K)95-07 
0.293 -2.411* 0.047 -0.005 0.046 -0.006 
(0.261) (1.101) (0.204) (0.115) (0.273) (0.044) 
R-squared 0.921 0.700 0.900 0.645 0.916 0.822 
N 319 319 319 318 319 319 
UK 
Ln(ICT/K)70-89 
-0.536 0.693 0.147 -0.048 0.044 0.224    
(0.569) (2.198) (0.517) (0.073) (0.507) (0.164)    
Ln(ICT/K)89-07 
0.326 -1.582 -0.370 0.313** 0.630 -0.597*   
(0.401) (1.225) (0.656) (0.124) (0.631) (0.272)    
R-squared 0.887 0.741 0.882 0.787 0.735 0.921 
N 418 418 418 418 418 418 
 
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are corrected for clustering of observations at the industry level 
and shown in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Subscripts like 89-07 denote the estimated coefficient using 1989 to 2007 data. 
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Table 7: Estimation of the wage share equation (4) using aggregated data from 11 industries 
in 9 EU countries from1970 to 2007 (country, industry and year dummies are included in all 
equations) 
Age 50+ (Older Workers) 
Dependent  
variable:  
wage shares 
Male Female 
High Intermediate Unskilled High Intermediate Unskilled 
Degree NVQ 1-4 None Degree NVQ 1-4 None 
Ln(K/Y) 0.097 -0.442 0.439 0.132** -0.33 0.164 
  (0.340) (0.526) (0.334) (0.056) (0.199) (0.260)    
Ln(ICT/K) 0.102 -0.245 -0.557*** 0.064** 0.100 0.253*   
  (0.161) (0.472) (0.193) (0.030) (0.092) (0.149)    
COORD -0.084* -0.012 0.032 0.001 0.001 0.021    
  (0.043) (0.079) (0.076) (0.011) (0.030) (0.022)    
EXT -1.592*** 0.059 -0.564** -0.377*** -0.050 0.251**  
  (0.227) (0.911) (0.225) (0.119) (0.147) (0.099)    
NMW 0.301*** 0.739*** -0.263*** 0.064* 0.232*** -0.198*** 
  (0.096) (0.203) (0.081) (0.038) (0.073) (0.045)    
WAGE 0.282*** 0.705*** 0.092 0.109*** 0.248*** -0.030    
  (0.051) (0.148) (0.127) (0.022) (0.040) (0.028)    
PENSIONS -0.315*** -0.752*** 0.340*** -0.100*** -0.124** 0.008    
  (0.060) (0.128) (0.084) (0.027) (0.054) (0.031)    
UD 0.018 -0.035 -0.118*** 0.016** -0.000 -0.020**  
  (0.022) (0.028) (0.025) (0.007) (0.012) (0.009)    
CENT -0.841 -8.482*** 0.887 0.375 -2.218*** 0.409    
  (0.900) (1.939) (1.085) (0.299) (0.827) (0.577)    
R-squared 0.711 0.733 0.846 0.483 0.747 0.666    
N 2970 2970 2970 2880 2965 2969    
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are corrected for clustering of observations at the 
country*industry level and shown in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 8: Estimation of the relative wage equation (6) using aggregated data from 11 industries 
in 9 EU countries from1970 to 2007 (country, industry and year dummies are included in all 
equations) 
Age 50+ (Older Workers) 
Dependent  
variable: 
relative 
wages 
Male Female 
High Intermediate Unskilled High Intermediate Unskilled 
Degree NVQ 1-4 None Degree NVQ 1-4 None 
Ln(K/Y) -0.025 0.013 0.335** -0.083 0.014 0.127 
  (0.085) (0.064) (0.162) (0.078) (0.041) (0.110)    
Ln(ICT/K) -0.000 0.025 0.091* 0.039 0.033 0.073*   
  (0.053) (0.032) (0.058) (0.052) (0.023) (0.039)    
COORD 0.020 0.056*** 0.059 -0.035* 0.009 0.036    
  (0.025) (0.020) (0.062) (0.019) (0.016) (0.051)    
EXT -0.576*** 0.231*** 0.053 -0.303*** 0.028 -0.035    
  (0.110) (0.064) (0.089) (0.061) (0.064) (0.070)    
NMW 0.211 -0.432*** -0.721*** 0.303*** -0.180** -0.488*** 
  (0.175) (0.078) (0.254) (0.039) (0.070) (0.112)    
WAGE -0.158*** 0.041 0.097* -0.039 0.045 0.032    
  (0.035) (0.035) (0.053) (0.032) (0.033) (0.041)    
PENSIONS 0.041 0.040 -0.123* -0.040 0.061* -0.050    
  (0.035) (0.025) (0.062) (0.037) (0.035) (0.043)    
UD 0.013** 0.000 -0.010* 0.013*** 0.011** 0.000    
  (0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005)    
CENT 0.050 0.185 1.428 0.441 -0.585 -1.061    
  (0.689) (0.304) (0.912) (0.508) (0.605) (1.017)    
R-squared 0.697 0.678 0.327 0.622 0.390 0.230    
N 2695 2695 2694 2603 2690 2694    
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are corrected for clustering of observations at the 
country*industry level and shown in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 9: Estimation of the employment share equation (7) using aggregated data from 11 industries in 9 EU 
countries from1970 to 2007 (country, industry and year dummies are included in all equations) 
Age 50+ (Older Workers) 
Dependent  
variable: 
employment 
share 
Male Female 
High Intermediate Unskilled High Intermediate Unskilled 
Degree NVQ 1-4 None Degree NVQ 1-4 None 
Ln(K/Y) -0.059 -0.298 0.457 0.214*** -0.402 -0.232 
  (0.155) (0.426) (0.410) (0.066) (0.268) (0.400)    
Ln(ICT/K) -0.039 -0.040 -0.690** 0.091*** -0.015 0.246    
  (0.085) (0.195) (0.280) (0.026) (0.132) (0.241)    
COORD -0.154*** -0.094 0.067 -0.045*** -0.035 0.004    
  (0.047) (0.083) (0.099) (0.014) (0.031) (0.074)    
EXT -0.329 -2.552*** -0.584 -0.703*** -0.660** 0.824*** 
  (0.224) (0.526) (0.512) (0.200) (0.252) (0.199)    
NMW -0.232 1.608*** 0.228 -0.066 0.088 0.740*** 
  (0.183) (0.288) (0.293) (0.070) (0.116) (0.220)    
WAGE 0.427*** 0.251 -0.940** 0.118*** 0.192** -0.276*   
  (0.065) (0.219) (0.390) (0.023) (0.091) (0.153)    
PENSIONS -0.348*** -0.418*** 1.426*** -0.086*** -0.106 0.420*** 
  (0.074) (0.147) (0.229) (0.027) (0.070) (0.119)    
UD 0.011 0.063*** -0.217*** 0.014** 0.026** -0.043*   
  (0.013) (0.016) (0.045) (0.006) (0.011) (0.023)    
CENT 1.832 -4.999** -10.615** -0.366 -2.604* -1.346    
  (1.480) (2.214) (4.352) (0.494) (1.408) (1.939)    
R-squared 0.767 0.695 0.715 0.634 0.791 0.553 
N 2695 2695 2694 2641 2694 2694 
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are corrected for clustering of observations at the 
country*industry level and shown in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 10: Estimation of the wage share equation (8) using dynamic specification (country, 
industry and year dummies are included in all equations) 
Age 50+ (Older Workers) 
Dependent 
variable: 
wage share 
changes 
Male Female 
High Intermediate Unskilled High Intermediate Unskilled 
Degree NVQ 1-4 None Degree NVQ 1-4 None 
Lagged 
Wage shares  
-0.066*** -0.047*** -0.029*** 0.027** -0.037*** -0.041*** 
(0.013) (0.010) (0.006) (0.011) (0.009) (0.004)    
Ln(K/Y) 0.003 -0.021 0.048** 0.006 0.035** 0.019*   
  (0.023) (0.037) (0.019) (0.005) (0.014) (0.011)    
Ln(ICT/K) 0.002 -0.004 -0.002 0.005** 0.006 0.006    
  (0.018) (0.025) (0.010) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004)    
COORD -0.034** 0.020 -0.016 0.004 0.003 -0.004    
  (0.013) (0.027) (0.021) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006)    
EXT -0.269*** -0.046 0.164*** -0.020 -0.039 0.075*** 
  (0.059) (0.128) (0.056) (0.013) (0.038) (0.028)    
NMW 0.058*** -0.215*** 0.016 0.005 -0.064*** -0.039*** 
  (0.019) (0.035) (0.022) (0.007) (0.016) (0.011)    
WAGE 0.045* 0.074 0.064 -0.002 -0.013 0.015    
  (0.023) (0.057) (0.040) (0.006) (0.015) (0.014)    
PENSIONS -0.029 -0.104 -0.063* -0.013 -0.013 -0.036*   
  (0.036) (0.075) (0.037) (0.011) (0.029) (0.018)    
UD 0.007*** -0.011 0.000 0.001** -0.001 -0.000    
  (0.002) (0.008) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)    
CENT 0.389** -0.165 -0.526** 0.024 -0.295* -0.186*   
  (0.150) (0.376) (0.254) (0.033) (0.152) (0.110)    
R-squared 0.075 0.157 0.102 0.071 0.108 0.079    
N 2871 2871 2871 2774 2866 2869    
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are corrected for clustering of observations at the 
country*industry level and shown in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
